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Abstract: In 2009 Elinor Ostrom received the Nobel Prize for her analysis of economic
governance of the commons. Specifically, by challenging the conventional wisdom at the
time, demonstrating how communities can successfully manage the common resources
without any regulation by central authorities or privatization. Ostrom proposed eight design
principles that identify the underlying criterion of institutions that have successfully
maintained CPRs over time. I examine whether Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles affect the
long-run functionality of borehole wells in Uganda using quantitative methods. I find that
the one of the principles, clearly defined boundaries, is significant in all four estimations, and
remains significant after all robustness test.

The author would like to thank Bruce Wydick my advisor; Morgan Adams and David Berger for
all there helpful input and comments; Jermey Ainebyona and Elizabeth Auma for outstanding
help with data collection and Living Water International for their in-country support.

“What is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of
his own, hardly at all the common interest.” –Aristotle

I. Introduction
As the global population grows, humans increase their reliance on the planet and continue
to put extensive stress on our natural resources. It is therefore critical that we understand
how resources are managed and maintained. Many natural resources are categorized as
common pool resources. A common pool (CPRs) resource is defined as a type of good that is
either a natural or human made resource system that is “non-excludable” but “rival” so that
the units of use are exhaustible (e.g. forests, fisheries, irrigation systems, and
groundwater). Many scholars have argued that individuals are not able to cooperate in order
to protect and sustain the long-run use of common pool resources. Before the 1980s most of
the literature and policies presumed that the management of CPRs was only successful when
enforced by external forces, such as the state or markets.

Scholars recommended

privatization or government centralization based on the theories of Gordon (1954), Olson
(1965), Demsetz (1967), Hardin (1967), and Dawes (1975). However, in the mid-1980s, much
of the literature began to questions these theories and their effectiveness in maintaining CPRs
over time (Feeny et al. 1990).
Elinor Ostrom received the Nobel Prize in 2009 for her analysis of economic governance
of the commons. Specifically, by challenging the conventional wisdom at the time,
demonstrating how communities can successfully manage the common resources without any
regulation by central authorities or privatization. Ostrom argued that the greatest problem
facing CPR management is that of organizing individuals away from independent decision
making towards the adoption of coordination in order to increase joint benefit and reduce
harm. This does not necessarily imply creating an organization, but rather the “process of
organizing,” requiring changes that order activities so that they are sequential, contingent, and
repeated. This occurs through repeated actions to increase the likelihood that the changes in
activities evolve and survive. (Ostrom 1990)
In her (1990) textbook Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action,
Ostrom proposes a theoretical alternative to centralization or privatization that relies on the
low transaction cost of information amongst resource users; the enforcement is not externally
enforced, but rather internally by the users themselves. The users make a binding contract in
order to maintain a cooperative strategy that they have created and agreed upon, incorporating

!

2

the cost of monitoring into the benefits, which are divided equally amongst all
users. (Ostrom 1990)
To test this theory empirically, Ostrom evaluated 14 cases of CPR management
institutions, which varied in degrees of success in the long-run maintenance of each resource.
Each CPR was located within one country and the number of users varied between 50 to
15,000 people. The users were dependent on the CPR for economic returns, and thus were
motivated to solve the common problems related to CPR management and enhance their own
productivity over time. Each case provided clear information about the process involved in:
(1) governing long-enduring CPRs, (2) transforming existing institutional arrangements, and
(3) failing to overcome continued CPR problems. Each case was used to understand how
“individuals organize and govern themselves to obtain collective benefits in situations where
the temptations to free-ride and to break commitment is substantial.” (Ostrom 1990)
Based on the evaluation of these 14 CPR management institutions, Ostrom constructed
a set of eight design principles (listed below) that identify the underlying criterion of
institutions that have successfully maintained CPRs over time and how this affects the
incentives (by reducing uncertainty through trust and norms of reciprocity) of the participants
to continue investing time and effort in the governance and management of the
CPR. Defining the principles as, “…an essential element or conditions that help to account
for the success of these institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance of
generations after generations of appropriators to the rules in use.” (Ostrom 1990)
Table 1.1 Design Principles: “Self-Organized Resource-Governance Regimes” - Ostrom 1990
1. Clearly defined boundaries: participants know who is in and who is out of a defined set of
relationships and thus with whom to cooperate.
2. Local Rules-in-use restrict the amount, timing, and technology of harvesting the resource;
allocate benefits proportional to required inputs; and are crafted to take local condition
into account.
3. Collective-choice arrangements: most of the individual affected by a resource regime can
participate in making and modifying the rules.
4. Monitoring: regimes select their own monitor, who are accountable to the users or are users
themselves and who keep an eye on resource conditions as well as on user behavior.
5. Use graduated sanctions that depend on the seriousness and context of the offense (“quasivoluntary” cooperation). (Levi 1988)
6. Access to rapid, low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and
officials— local mechanisms to air conflict immediately and resolutions that are generally
known in the community
7. Whether the regime is recognized by the national or local government
For CPRs that are parts of lager systems
8. Nested enterprises – all other principles are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
!
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A considerable volume of literature1 has examined the validity of Ostrom’s (1990) design
principles with mixed results. However, a majority of the literature has been descriptive case
studies; very few have been statistical, none of which have focused exclusively on Ostrom
(Cox 2001). This paper looks at the quantitative relationship of Water User Committees, in
terms of Ostrom’s Design Principles, and the long-run functionality of 60 borehole wells in
rural Uganda. First, I use a methodology to construct an index variable for seven of the Eight
Ostrom Design Principles, from 57 individual survey questioned designed based of Ostrom’s
theory. I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules,
collective action, monitor, sanction, conflict and authority index. This allows me to quantify
each of the principles using several variables for each. I am the first, to my knowledge, to us
such an approach in in this body of literature.
Second, I use four different dependent variables to measure the functionality of the well.
The first variable is binary, functioned or broken at the time of survey. I use a linear
probability, logit, and probit model to estimate the relationship against each design principle.
The second two dependent variables are the “number of times the well was fixed” and “the
number of times it broke”. For these dependent variables I use a Poisson estimation. The
final variable is an Anderson Index of all three dependent variables, using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation.
I find that the Boundary Principle is significant in all four estimations, and remains
significant after all robustness test, except in the case of the final OLS regression. This finding
aligns with the pervious literature, in particular the meta-analysis of 91 studies, which found
boundaries to be significant a majority of the time. (Cox 2010) When regressing the indices on
“the number of times the well was fixed” I find that local rules, sanctions, and conflict are also
significant but after the bonferroni-holm step-down test both conflict and sanctions are no
longer significant.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes and critiques theories
based on external enforcement of CPRs and studies on internal enforcement including
Ostrom. Section III presents the methodology for this study, which outlines how the data was
collected, general summary statistics of how well the wells function and the empirical model
and hypothesis. Section IV focuses on the results of the study. Section V presents the
conclusion and policy implication of the study.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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II. Literature Review
Before the 1980s most of the literature and policies presumed that the management of
CPRs was only successful when enforced by external forces, such as the state or markets. There
are three models that are generally relied on for policy prescription; one is Hardin’s “tragedy of
the commons”, the second is the Prisoner’s Dilemma model of strategic choice, and the final is
Olson’s collective action. However, the application of such theories has achieved results that are
mixed at best. An explanation of each concept and a summarization of the critiques of each
model follow.

“Tragedy of the commons”
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” proposes that individuals are short-term, selfinterested, “rational” actors that seek to maximize their own gains. As such, people will exploit
commons as long as the cost to them personally is less then the benefits they receive. Hardin
illustrates this point by using the example of a pasture “open to all” with many herders. Each
herder receives a direct benefit from his own cattle so his instinct is to increase the number of
cattle to maximize his benefit.

However, because each herder is increasing the cattle

simultaneously the individual farmer suffers from delayed cost from the decline of the
commons, which then leads to overgrazing.
“Therin is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination
toward which all man rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that
believes in the freedom of the commons” (Hardin 1968)
This theory, however, assumes that the individual (in this case the herder) does not have
any information about the aggregate state of the CPR or the tipping point in which the resource
will be fully exploited and collapse. Empirically this assumption may hold in situations such as
ocean whaling or extensive commons grazing lands used by scattered communities, but the
assumption does not hold in many other cases of CPRs. (Wade 1987) The pressing issue here
being that the amount of information each individual using the commons has about the larger
picture of the resource in which they are operating in is not always limited. (Kimber 1983).
Hardin’s theory also does not distinguish between CPRs that are necessary to the
individuals’ survival, and those that are not. Kimber argues in “The Tragedy of the Commons
Reappraised” that it is more likely that the logic behind the theory will hold only when the
resource is not vital. The argument being that when survival is at risk the ‘rational’ individual act
out of self-control so as not to destroy their mode of survival. (Kimber 1983)
!
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Likewise, Hardin does not distinguish between a resource that is open to all (no property
rights) and one that is of joint property (common property rights). The case of joint property is
vastly different from that of open access to all. It is much more likely users will adhere to rules
of restricted use with common property, due to the fact that a certain user group that is precise
and therefore easier to define binds access. By ignoring this distinction all CPRs are falsely
generalized as common property. (Wade 1987)

Prisoner’s Dilemma
Hardin’s model is often formalized by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. (Dawes 1975) A
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game that conceptualizes a non-cooperative situation in which two or
more individual’s outcome depends on the other’s choice. By choosing the individual dominate
strategy, given the assumption that the player is not aware of the other player’s choice/action,
players always choose the strategy to defect, no matter what the other player chooses. This
produces an equilibrium that is the third-best result for each player; a Pareto-optimal but also
Pareto-inferior as the better, unstable, equilibrium would be if both cooperated. (Ostrom 1990)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has captivated social scholars, as it seems to provide an
explanation to the paradox in which rational individual strategies can lead to collectively
irrational outcomes, challenging the concept that rational human beings should attain rational
outcomes. (Ostrom 1990)
However, there are two key assumptions that need to hold in order for the model to
work. One being that the players do not communicate with one another before making their
choice. The second being that the choice holds and cannot be revoked once discovering the
other player’s choice. The first assumption implies that the players aren’t able to negotiate with
one another to reach an optimal outcome. Therefore the change in the rules or negotiation has
to come, if at all, from an external force. (Wade 1987) This could be the case in some instances
in which monitoring is extremely difficult or impossible and so restricting access is also difficult
and therefore the individual can defect without cost. Examples include:

air pollution,

international waters, or resources that exist in two or more regions/states.
The logic changes when the game is played repeatedly where the chances that the
individuals will co-operate increases now in hopes that others do so in the future. This is also the
case if either of the assumptions is relaxed; if the individual learns quickly what the other
chooses and can alter their own choice or if they are able to negotiate amongst themselves, the
equilibrium flips to co-operate. (Wade 1987)
!
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Collective Action
The core proposition of Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action is that “unless the
number of individual is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to
make individuals act in their common interest, the rational, self-interested individual will not act to
achieve their common or group interests.”(Olson 1965) The principle of the theory being that an
individual who can not be excluded from the benefits of a collective good once it is produced
has no or little incentive to contribute to the provision of the good in the first place. Thus
cooperation is a question of how noticeable each individual’s actions are and by how strong
social bonds are. (Olson 1965, Ostrom 1990)
The core of each one of these models, including Olson’s, is the problem of free-riding.
Whenever one individual cannot be excluded from the benefits that are provided by the good or
resource, each individual has the incentive not to contribute to either the provision or
maintenance of the good/resource but rather to “free ride” on others’ efforts. The extreme of
such an outcome being that if all individual decided to “free-ride, the good or resource would
not be provided and/or heavily exploited; the sub-optimal outcome is when some individuals
“free-ride” when others don’t and optimal level of provision is not achieved. (Ostrom 1990,
Wade 1987)
According to Elinor Ostrom, in the most general terms the other greatest problem
facing CPR management is that of organizing: how to change the situation from independent
decision making to one in which individuals adopt coordination in order to increase joint benefit
and reduce harm. This does not necessary imply creating an organization, but rather the process
of organizing, requiring changes that order activities so that they are sequential, contingent, and
repeated. This occurs through repeated actions to increase the likelihood of the changes in
activities evolve and survives. (Ostrom 1990)
Ostrom argues that, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the prisoners are not able to change the
constraints imposed upon them, because they are in jail. This is, however, not the case for all
users of CPRs. She addresses this with an articulate quote, “As long as individuals are viewed as
prisoners, policy prescriptions will address this metaphor. I would rather address the questions
of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change the constraining rules of the
game to lead to outcomes other then remorseless tragedies.” (Ostrom 1990)
In response to the idea that the influence these models have on state and market policies
does not produce the only or optimal solutions, Ostrom proposed her alternative solution of the
8 design principles (as mentioned above), that rely on the low transaction cost of information
amongst resource users: the enforcement is not externally enforced, but rather internally by the
!
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users themselves; and the users of the resource themselves make a binding contract in order to
maintain a cooperative strategy that they created and agreed upon. Incorporating the cost of
monitoring into the benefits, which is divided equally amongst all users. (Ostrom 1990)
It is important to note two other seminal works on the analysis of local based efforts to
manage and govern CPRs: Robert Wade’s Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action
in South and Baland and Platteau’s Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is there a role for rural
communities? These works (as well as Ostrom’s), are among the first comparative studies to
examine theoretical development of the time and use theory to inform their analysis of selfgoverned CPRs. All three share many overlapping conclusions.
In his study of 31village irrigation systems, Wade concludes that effective rules of
restraint on access and use are not likely to be sustainable when boundaries are unclear, when
users are not in one location, and when monitoring is difficult. He identifies 14 conditions, all
and all, to be imperative to the sustainability and management of CPRs. (Wade 1988, Argawal
2001)
Baland and Platteau, on the other hand, use a large number of studies of CPRs to
conduct a comprehensive review and synthesis. After examining competing theoretical claims
on different types of property regimes and a wide range of empirical studies on CPRs that focus
on several variables, they conclude with results that are similar to Ostrom’s and Wade’s: CPRs
are successful when there are small user groups, effective enforcement, past experience of
cooperation, external aid and strong leadership and the users are near the resource. (Baland &
Platteau 1996, Argawal 2001)
Table 2.1 summarizes and lists under the four categories (resource system characteristics,
group characteristics, institutional arrangements and the external environment) the conditions
the three authors have identified as significant to the long-run management of CPRs. Compiled
by Argawal in the review Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources.
Table 2.1 Synthesis of facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and
Platteau
1. Resource system characteristics
i) Small size (RW)
i) Well-defined boundaries (RW, EO)
2. Group characteristics
(i) Small size (RW, B&P)
(ii) Clearly defined boundaries (RW, EO)
(iii) Shared norms (B&P)
(iv) Past successful experiences---social capital (RW, B&P)

!
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(v) Appropriate leadership---young, familiar with changing external environments, connected to local
traditional elite (B&P)
(vi) Interdependence among group members (RW, B&P)
(vii) Heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identities and interests (B&P)
1. and 2. Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics
(i) Overlap between user group residential location and resource location (RW, B&P)
(ii) High levels of dependence by group members on resource system(RW)
(iii) Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources (B&P)
3. Institutional arrangements
(i) Rules are simple and easy to understand (B&P)
(ii) Locally devised access and management rules (RW, EO, B&P)
(iii) Ease in enforcement of rules (RW, EO, B&P)
(iv) Graduated sanctions (RW, EO)
(v) Availability of low cost adjudication (EO)
(vi) Accountability of monitors and other officials to users (EO, B&P)
1. and 3. Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements
(i) Match restrictions on harvest to generation of resources (RW,EO)
4. External environment
(i) Technology: Low cost exclusion technology (RW)
(ii) State:
(a) Central governments should not undermine local authority (RW, EO)
(b) Supportive external sanctioning institutions (B&P)
(c) Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation activities (B&P)
(d) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance (EO)
(Argawal 2001)

A substantial volume of literature, both empirical and qualitative, has accrued concerning
the usefulness and validity of Ostrom’s design principles. According to a meta-analysis, in which
of 91 studies (from search of academic databases, relevant journals, and the Political Theory and
Policy at Indiana University) each design principle varies in significance and overall importance
to the long-run maintenance of the resource. The most strongly supported principles are:
boundaries, but only in the around community users and not the physical boundaries; adherence
to local conditions and proportional cost incurred to benefits received; and the presence of
monitors that are users of the resource. The rest of the principles were only moderately
supported by the data in the 91 studies included in the meta-analysis. Each variable was coded
and tested for ordinance and to determine whether the variables were independent from the
success variables. (Cox 2010)

!
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III. Methodology
Data
Local community-level cooperation of ground water management in Uganda has varied over
time. Starting in the 1930s, groundwater development has consisted of the construction of deep
boreholes, drip systems, shallow wells and protected springs. In 2006 there were approximately
20,000 deep boreholes, 3,000 shallow wells and 12,000 protected springs in Uganda constructed
mainly for rural domestic water supply. Under the Rural Water Supply Investment Plan of 2000,
construction of an additional 40,000 hand-pumped boreholes and 30,000 shallow wells were
needed in order to reach the 2015 Water Sector targets.2 The 1995 Water Act required that every
source water point in Uganda have a Water User Committee (WUC) to maintain the water
source through community organization. In some cases these committees have been successful
and others the water points have fallen into disrepair.
In this study, data was collected on the unit level of the WUC of 60 borehole wells in
villages spread over fifteen sub-counties within Ruhaama County in the Ntungamo District of
Uganda. All of the wells were drilled by Living Water, an NGO, from 2010 to 2014. The
WUCs surveyed for this study were randomly selected from all wells drilled by Living Water in
the Ruhaama County. For each WUC, 1 to 4 members were individually surveyed. The majority
of the data in this analysis is based on the WUC unit, aggregated at the mean response of each
committee member. In general the variation between answers was much greater across WUCs
than within the individual WUC.

General Functioning of the Water User Committees
Of the 60 committees surveyed, 42 reported how long they have been active; of these,
10 have been active since 2010, 11 since 2011, 13 since 2012 and 8 since 2013. Of the 60 wells,
29 (48%) have active WUCs. Of the 37 functioning wells, 62% have active WUCs. Of the 23
non-functioning wells, 26% have active WUCs and 74% don't. From anecdotal evidence it
appears that quite a few of the WUCs disbanded after the wells broke the first time. The other
reasons mentioned included that the committees became inactive when the elected or
appointed members realized they would not be compensated or they weren’t trained so felt illequipped to address the issues of maintenance and repair.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!UN-Water; World Water Assessment Programme (2006).National Water Development Report: Uganda. Prepared for 2nd
UN World Water Development Report "Water, a shared responsibility".. Retrieved October 2, 2014
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Each WUC is required to have a president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary. Most of
the WUC members are either elected or appointed; of the 60 committees, 32 reported being
elected by vote and 19 reported being appointed. Usually the elections took place at a town
meeting directly after the well has been constructed. It is not mandatory to attend these
meetings and so only those who show up, vote. Based on qualitative evidence a majority of the
presidents and vice presidents are prominent members of the community: principles of the
local school, doctors, store owners, etc. Of the 60 wells only 20 of the WUCs reported holding
regular elections.
The regularity of convening a meeting with all committee members varied among
WUCs. Of the 60 committees, 22 reported meeting at least once every 3-6 months, 3 once a
year, 4 in the last five years, 5 never, and 1 every month. General meetings attended by all
households who use the well, are usually held twice a year. Only 1 committee reported holding
a general meeting every month, 22 said they hold one every 3 to 6 months, 8 said they meet
once a year, 7 biannually, and 13 reported never having a general meeting.
Twenty-three of the committees surveyed reported collecting fees for future
maintenance costs; most committees collected a monthly fee and 3 WUCs collected fees per
use of the well (use was regulated by locking the well house and appointing a caretaker who
was responsible for the key and allowing people to use the well). Only 25 of the WUCs
reported the average amount of the fee collected; of the WUCs that reported, the average
amount of each fee varied substantially from 750 UGX to 7000 UGX (from about 22 cents to
2 USD).
Of the 60 Borehole Wells sampled, 37 (68%) still functioned and 23 were broken. Of the
27 wells drilled in 2010, 15 were functioning at the time of the survey, 8 of the 15 drilled in
2011, 9 of the 12 in 2012, 4 of the 5 in 2013, and zero of the 1 in 2014 (see Chart 1). Of the
60 wells, 21 had never stopped functioning at the time of the survey; of the wells that had
stopped functioning, 27 had been repaired and 12 had not yet been repaired at the time of the
survey. The number of times the wells had broken varied between 1 and 9. The shortest
amount of time it took to repair a well was one day the longest was 52 days, excluding the
wells that had not yet been repaired.
Of the 37 functioning wells, 32 were used regularly. However, only 22 (59%) of the 37 wells
were used for drinking water; meaning that of the 60 wells only 37% of them are used to obtain
drinking water (see Chart 2). This is most likely due to high levels of iron content in some of
the wells, a result of high levels in the groundwater or possibly from the piping itself. No tests
of the water iron levels were conducted at the time of the survey but the question was asked,
!

11

“Does the community use the water for drinking? And if not why?” A majority of the answers
to the question “why,” were that the water was orange in color and when boiled turned
everything, including the pot black; both of these are indicators of high iron contamination.

Approach
In The Governing the Commons, Ostrom makes the assumption that people with effective
CPR institutions are “good,” meaning that in general the members of the institutions are
individuals that share a past and expect to share a future (reducing their discount rates). They
tend not to vary much in assets, skill, knowledge, and ethnicity. Ostrom also states, “This list
of design principles is still quite speculative. I am not yet willing to argue that these design
principles are necessary conditions for achieving institutional robustness in CPR
settings. More empirical work is needed.” (Ostrom 1990)
Thus, it could be argued that Ostrom does not make a causal claim but rather that of a
correlation between presence of the criterion of design principles and positive outcome of a
sustained CPR over time. Therefore, in terms of an effective identification strategy, it is not
as imperative as we are more interested in conditional correlation than causation. However,
with that said control variables will be used in the regressions to take into account both the
physical and environmental conditions of the wells.
In order to test Ostrom’s theory that the presence of the 8 Design Principles are
positively correlated with sustaining CPRs over the long-run the following methods will be
used; (a) test whether of any of the 57 variables designed to measure the different aspects of the
design principles are necessary or sufficient in terms of the functioning of the 60 borehole wells
surveyed in this study; (b) test the correlation between each of the design principles and the
function of the well; (c) regress the design principles against four different dependent variables
that measure the long-run functionality of the 60 borehole wells; and (d) run a series of
regressions on all 127 combinations of each variable against the functionality of each well.

Empirical Specification:
!"#$%&'#! =!∝ ! +!!! !"#$% + !! !"#$% + !! !!!!"#$%&" + !! !"#$%"&
+ !! !"#$%&'# + !! !"#$%&'( + !! !"#ℎ!"#$% + ! !! !
To estimate the correlation I run three different regressions each with a different
dependent variable. The three dependent variables are used to measure how well the
boreholes functioned: (a) whether the well functions on inspection or not; (b) how many
!
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times the well has broken since it was installed; and (c) number of times it has been repaired in
that time. A fourth dependent variable was constructed using an Anderson Index matrix.
For the dependent variables in all three sets I use the method outlined in Anderson
(2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective action, monitor, sanction, conflict and
authority index. This method uses inverse covariance weighting to capture unique information
in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables equally. Refer to Table 1 for variables
used in each individual index.
Based on Ostrom’s hypothesis one would expect to see a positive correlation of each of
the design principles. In terms of the regression, conclusion on the causal relationships will not
be possible, only the likelihood that the well functions in the presence of the design principles.
Ostrom’s Principles are more qualitative than quantitative in nature; in order to
accurately measure the criterion many dichotomous (often with yes or no answers) or
categorical variables were constructed. Due to the relatively small sample size of 60 wells in this
study, statistical power is limited, and thus testing many independent variables could result in
multiple inference, where significant coefficients may emerge simply by chance. (Anderson
2008) In order to control for this, the number of independent variables is reduced by
implementing the use of summary indices; i.e., each index combines multiple measures to
reduce the total number of tests conducted.
In this study select dependent variables were categorized into groups according to seven
of Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles: clearly defined boundaries; rules that adapt to local
condition; collective choice that allow users to participate in the process; effective monitoring;
graduated sanctions; mechanisms for conflict resolution; recognition from higher level
authority; and nested enterprises. However, the eighth principle (nested enterprises) is only
relevant for large common-pool resources so will not be included in this study. From each
group of variables an individual index was constructed using an Anderson Index, so that each
design principle has its own matrix variable.
i. Boundaries: Individuals or households who have the rights to withdraw resource units
from the CPR as well as the boundaries of the CPR itself must be clearly defined, as
must the boundaries of the CPR itself. The theory underlying this principle is an
important one: if the boundaries are not defined the resource is left open to
“outsiders,” and the appropriator (those using/maintaining the resource) risk any of
the benefits produced by their efforts being reaped by others who have not
contributed to the maintenance of the resource, causing the appropriator to have little
interest or incentive in coordinating and investing in the resources. In the WUC
survey of the boreholes in Uganda this was measured by: whether or not the WUCs
had a list of households that used the well; if the list was updated; and if the list of well
!
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ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

!

users was used to collect fees. Of the 60 WUCs only 20 of the reported having a list; of
those only 12 said they updated the list.
Local Rules: Appropriation of rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision of rules
requiring labor, materials, and/or money. In all the successful cases studied by
Ostrom, the rules reflect the specific attributes of the particular resource and thus help
to maintain the resource over time. In the case of the Ugandan borehole study, one of
the major tasks/rules of the WUC is to mobilize the community labor to maintain and
repair the well. The purpose of the organization is to make sure there is a fence around
the well, the surrounding area is kept clean, the water catchment areas is protected and
also to regulate activities that can or cannot be conducted around the borehole. Of the
60 committees 35 reported organizing the committee for orderly use.
Collective Choice: Most individuals affected by the operational rules should be able
to participate in modifying the operational rules, allowing the appropriators to tailor
rules to local circumstances. As the individuals who directly interact and know the
resource, are better able to modify the rules to fit specific local circumstances. This
keeps the cost of changing rules relatively low. To measure this in terms of the WUCs,
the members were asked in the survey if: they had a constitution and by-laws; how
well the households using the well understood the laws; how well the rules changed; if
the rules were perceived as fair; if the committee members were elected; if the
household members could revise the rules; and how many household know about the
rules that guide the committee.
Monitoring: Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior,
should either be accountable to the appropriators or are appropriators themselves. The
presence of a monitor brings people who do not comply with the rules to the attention
of the community, which helps enforce the rules and strengthens trust. The caretaker
(usually a member of the community) of the borehole wells surveyed in Uganda takes
on this job; although there was the rare case in which a watchman was also hired. To
measure the principle of monitoring, the survey posed the following questions to the
WUCs: if a caretaker has been assigned; and if they had hired a watchman. Of the 60
wells, approximately 40 of the 60 reported having a caretaker.
Sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be given graduated
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other
appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. This helps
to maintain community trust and cohesion, increasing their willingness to make a
contingent self-commitment. As sanctioning occurs on a case-by-case basis it is
necessary to take into account the severity of the violations. To measure the
occurrence and severity of sanctioning, the survey asked the WUC members if and at
what cost the following activities were sanctioned: washing clothes, washing your
jerrycan (container for transporting water), watering your cows at the well; vandalizing
the well; refusing to pay fees; or defecating by or near the well.
Conflict Resolution: Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost
local arenas to resolve conflict among appropriators or between appropriators and
officials. Individuals can interpret rules differently so conflict can be unavoidable at
times. Thus, if users are going to follow rules over a long period time, discussions
resolving what constitutes an infraction need to be organized on a consistent
basis. The questions on the borehole survey that measured how conflict was resolved
were as follows: can household members call meetings and, if so, how many meetings
have been called; are rules changed at the suggestion of the households; and are you
able to remove a committee member for poor performance.
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vii. Authority: The rights of the appropriators to devise their own institutions should not
be challenged by external governmental authorities. This stipulates that an external
government agency does not undermine or challenge the rules devised by the local
users. For the WUCs this was measured by: whether or not they were registered at the
local district level; and who asked them to form the WUC: a Community Based
Organization, LivingWater, an NGO other than LivingWater, or the government.
Description of the independent variables of the indices, including their mean values with
standard deviation and the range of variation, are given in Table 1.
Each of the seven summary indices consolidates many of the multiple independent
variables, but we still have seven to test. So in order to control for over testing and maintain
the number of indices the p values will be adjusted by using a Family-wise Error Rate (FWER)
control. Where a family of M hypotheses, H1, H2,…HM, is tested, of which J are true (J<M).
As more hypotheses are added to a family the probability of rejecting at least one of them at a
given significance level increases, and thus FWER increases. In this research, the family of
tested hypotheses is the set of the seven Ostrom summary index tests. The common
technique is the Bonferonni correction, however in this study will use a step-down
Bonferonni-Holm resampling method that is concerned to be more powerful in the literature.
As mentioned above the result of this study cannot be concluded as causal due to the
nature of the observational data collected and the possible endogeneity in the error term
caused by omitted variable bias. In order to test the effect of the omitted variable bias two
bounds tests will be conducted. The first approach uses a method by Altonji, Elder and Taber
(2001) to assess the results of the OLS where each Ostrom Index is regressed on the Function
Index. The Altonji, Elder and Taber (AET) proposes an estimation of the bias, due to
endogeneity, in the OLS estimation assuming that the relationship between the effect to the
treatment and the unobservable is proportional to the relationship between treatment and
unobservable variables. From this assumption a bias correction can be obtained and a point
estimate of this ratio. Emily Oster (2015) builds on framework showing that it is necessary to
take into account coefficient movement and movements in the R-squared values to identify
the omitted variable bias. I will use this to obtain the ratio of influence of the observable to
unobservable variables on each Ostrom Index and a given bound on the beta coefficient.

!
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IV. Results
In order to determine the relationship of the 57 individual variables to the functionality
of the well, each variable was cross-tabulated with the binary function variable; 0 being that the
well is broken and 1 that it functions. Of the 57 variables none of them were sufficient or
necessary on their own. Twelve of the variables, however, were significant when tested by a
Pearson’s and likelihood-ratio test, which test the hypothesis that the rows and columns in a
two-way table are independent. (Campbell 2007) Table 2 shows the results of the crosstabulated variables that were significant. The main finding were that 90% of the wells that had a
list of housed that used the well functioned; 88% of the wells that were regularly used by the
household function; 84% of the wells that used the water for drinking functioned. The rest of
the variables ranged from 60% to 80%.
The second test was to see if any of seven indices are correlated with whether or not the
well functions. Table 3 displays the results for each index in terms of four different measures
of the dependent variables listed above. Column (1) is the binary function; column (2) is how
many times it was fixed; column (3) is number of times the well needed to be repaired; and
column (4) is the index of all three.
The boundary index is strongly correlated to each of the four dependent variables; .36 in
terms of the binary function; .57 to number of times fixed; .47 to number of times repairs
were necessary, and .29 for the function index. In order to check for significance and control
for over testing, each of the dependent variables were run as a pairwise correlation with a
Bonferroni adjustment to calculate the significance levels. The boundary index is statistically
significant at the 1% level in terms of correlation between both number of times the well was
fixed and number of repairs. The local rules index is statistically significant at the 5% level in
terms of correlation with the number of times the well was fixed.
Table 4 displays the results of the impact of the 7 Ostrom Design Principles on the
functioning of the well. Whether or not a well functioned is a discrete decision (functions or
broken) and is thus evaluated using a discrete regression model.3 Column (1) is a Linear
Probability Model (2) is a Logit Model and (3) is a Probit Model.
The results in terms of sign of the coefficient and significance are constant across all three
models. The coefficient of the LP model is approximately .25 of the Logit and .40 of the
Probit. The boundary index is found to have a positive statistically significant effect on
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!Where the coefficient are as the “odds ratio,” so they are interpreted as more or less likely not by
magnitude
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functionality. This suggests that having strong boundaries in terms of having a user list and
maintaining the well frequently increase the likelihood that the well is functioning. Both
monitoring and collective indices have positive coefficients but neither of them is
significant. This implies that monitoring or collective-choice arrangements do not increase
the likelihood that the well functions. Contrary to Ostrom’s hypothesis both local rules and
sanctions have a negative coefficient, but neither is significant.
Table 5 displays the results of the impact of the 7 Ostrom Design Principles on the
functioning of the well in terms of how many times it has needed repair and how many times
it was fixed. Both dependent variables in this case are count data so the Poisson Model is
used. Column (1) is the dependent variable for the number of times the well was fixed;
column (2) is the number of times the well needed repair. To check for over-dispersion of the
data, a post-estimation was conducted. The p-value on the Chi-squared test was significant,
so robust standard errors were used to correct for heteroskedasticity.
In terms of the number of times the well was fixed all of the signs for the indices are
positive except for the conflict and authority index. This is contrary to what Ostrom
hypothesized, however the authority index is not statically significant and the conflict index is
significant at the 10% level. Both the boundary and local rules index are positive and
statistically significantly at the 1% level; the sanction index is also positive and significant at
the 10% level. To test for over-testing a Bonferroni-Holm correction was used; the boundary
index and local rules remain significant at the 1% level, however the conflict index is no
longer significant.
In terms of the number of times the well needed to be repaired the signs of the
coefficients have mixed results. Similar to the number of times fixed the authority index is
negatively correlated along with the monitoring index; however neither of the coefficients is
significant. Again both the boundary and local rules index are positively correlated and
significant at the 1% level. After the Bonferroni-Holm correction the only the boundary
index is still significant at the 5% level.
Table 6 displays the results of the OLS regression using the function index as the
dependent variable. Column (1) is regress just the seven indices (2) includes the control for
condition of the water (3) includes the control for the year the well was constructed (4)
includes both controls. Robust standard errors were used to control for heteroskedasticity.
The only index that is positively correlated and significant for each three models is the
boundary index. Both the coefficient and significance level increase when the control for the
year is added, and then decrease slightly when both controls are added. Most of the signs of
!
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the other coefficients stay constant; except for the monitor index that flips to negative when
the control for the year the well was constructed is added, however, it is not statistically
significant. After the Bonferroni-Holm correction the boundary index is not significant for
any of the regressions.
Due to the fact that there are seven “treatment” variables in each of the regressions it is
possible that linear correlation between each index variable is creating the sign of each
coefficient to flip or the significance level. To test this I run 127 regression with each possible
combination of the seven index variables. So, for example the first seven regressions are
index “x” against the functionality of the well.

Then the next 21 regressions are a

combination of two of the seven variables regressed on the functionality, and so on. I run
this on both the binary function variable using a Linear Probablity model and “number of
times fixed” with a Poisson estimation. I find that the boundary index is significant at the
10% level 60 out of the 64 possible combinations (94%) when regressed against the binary
variable. When regressed against “number of times fixed” the boundary index, local rules and
sanctions were significant at the 10% level for all 64 possible combinations (100%), collective
action 61% of the time, conflict 30% and monitor 22%. See Table 7 and 8 for full results.
In a recent paper Emily Oster showed the importance of accounting for coefficient
movements and movements in R-squared values in identifying omitted variable bias through a
bounds test. She demonstrated “that in the empirically common case with multiple observed
controls it is also necessary to account for the share of the variation treatment accounted for
by control variables.” (Oster, 2014) Using the Emily Oster test the new estimated beta
coefficient for the boundary index in the OLS Index regression is .21. The delta is -7.78; a
negative delta implies controls move coefficient further from null.

See Table 9 for full

results.

V. Conclusion
In this paper I examine whether Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles affect the long-run
functionality of borehole wells in Uganda. I find that the boundary index is significant in all
four estimations, and remains significant after all robustness test, except in the case of the final
OLS regression. It is also significant almost 100% when running the 127 permutations of all
seven indices on when regressed both on the binary function and the number of times the well
was fixed. This finding aligns with the pervious literature, in particular the meta-analysis of 91
studies, which found boundaries to be significant a majority of the time. (Cox 2010) It is
!
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important to distinguish that the boundary principle in this case is in terms of the “boundaries”
around who uses the well rather then the physical boundaries around the well (i.e. there was a
list kept of the users of the well, the list was updated annually, and was used to collect fees).
When regressing the indices on “the number of times the well was fixed” local rules, sanctions,
and conflict are significant but after the Bonferroni-Holm step-down test both conflict and
sanctions are no longer significant.
Due to the qualitative nature of Ostrom’s theory, statistical-analytical work is valuable in
identifying overall patterns in the data but it is also important to have what Agrwal refers to as a
“close analysis” or “thick reading” of the context of the data in order to interpret the statistical
patterns. (Argwal 2006)

During the field work and through discussions with the members of

the Water User Committees (WUCs) and community we found that there was frequent issue of
high iron levels in the water, which in result turned the water a deep orange color and when
boiled turned it black. Although it was not determined whether this had any impact on the users
health it was clear that the users were deterred not only form using the water but also
maintaining the well.

This knowledge and other qualitative finding were essential to

understanding how the committees functioned and the statistical analysis.
My results are internally valid in terms of borehole wells in Uganda, run by Water User
Committees, but further research is needed to determine external validity.

This study shows

that quantitative work can be used to assess Ostrom’s work and more generally the internal
management of common pool resources, but it also demonstrates the importance of the
circumstantial variation and qualitative nature of both the theory and practice. Thus it should
make us cautious when appealing it broadly in across all CPRs and resource governance.
The policy implications are really three-fold. In terms of the Living Water wells in
Uganda it is imperative that the issue of water contamination in terms of the level of iron is
addressed and remedied. This can be accomplished by testing the underground water quality
prior to drilling and returning six months after the well is drilled to check the quality. Further
research should also be conducted to determine if the contamination is due to the groundwater
or the pipes being used in the wells themselves. Once this is accomplished, each WUC should
be encouraged by those who drill the wells (whether that is the government or NGO) to keep a
detailed updated list of all the household who use the well, and the list should be used to keep
record of those who pay the fees.
The second implication is in terms of decentralized government structures that were
popularized in the 1990s based on many of the self-governance theories discussed in this paper,
including Ostrom’s. A majority of Sub-Saharan African countries have decentralized
!
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governments, which really heavily on small local level authorities or committees to disrepute
public goods such as health care, education, and utilities and maintain CPRs such as wells,
groundwater, forests, and in some cases fishery. Thus it is imperative that further quantitative
research is conducted to determine whether this type of governance is effective in delivering and
maintaining public services and conservations.

Finally as the population increase and we put

more pressure on Common Pool Resources it is important that further research is conducted on
the causal relationship between different management strategies and the sustainability of the
resource over the long-run.
!
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Chart 1: Well Functionality By Year
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Table 1: Variables for Ostrom Design Principle Indices
Boundaries:
VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

Household list*
HH List updated*
Collect Fee*

60
60
60

0.333
0.200
0.383

0.475
0.403
0.490

0
0
0

1
1
1

Local Rules:
VARIABLES
Clean around
well*
minserv*
Protect the well*
Fence around the
well*
Finance training*
Group training*
Trouble shooting
training*
Maintenance
repair training *
Mobilization
training*

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

60

0.650

0.481

0

1

60
60
60

0.433
0.600
0.550

0.500
0.494
0.502

0
0
0

1
1
1

60
60
60

0.600
0.633
0.617

0.494
0.486
0.490

0
0
0

1
1
1

60

0.600

0.494

0

1

60

0.683

0.469

0

1

Collective Action:
VARIABLES
Constitution*
By laws*
Bylaw understood
Rules can change
Rules are perceived
as fair
Community is
engaged*
Committee elect
Rules can be
revised*
Rules are known

!

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

60
60
51
47
50

0.700
0.783
2.152
2.381
4.030

0.462
0.415
0.588
0.567
0.933

0
0
1
2
1

1
1
4
4
5

60

0.517

0.504

0

1

52
60

1.420
0.783

0.492
0.415

1
0

3
1

51

3.874

1.025

1

5

25

Monitoring:
VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

Caretaker*
Watchman*

60
60

0.667
0.0833

0.475
0.279

0
0

1
1

Sanctions:
VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

Prohibit behavior*
Sanction*
Wash clothes
Wash jerry can
Water cow
Vandalize
Refuse to pay fee
Defecate

60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60

0.550
0.767
2.651
4.306
1.189
3.172
2.825
1.999

0.502
0.427
2.361
2.989
1.104
2.331
2.145
1.580

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
7
7
6
7
7
7

VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

Call Meetings*
Change Rules*
Have Sanctions*

60
60
60

0.583
0.0667
0.767

0.497
0.252
0.427

0
0
0

1
1
1

VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

52

2.168

0.587

1

4

60

0.183

0.390

0

1

Conflict Resolution:

Authorities:

Who formed
Committee*
Committee is
registered*

* In the description of a variable an asterisk indicates that the variable takes only two values, 0 and 1.
** Histogram is relatively normally distributed
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Table 2: Cross-tabulation of Individual Variables and Functionality

!

Total

Registered
0
1
Total

Function
0 1
21 28
3 8
24 36

Percent

49
11
60

42.86%
72.73%

Total

Percent

Use H20
0
1
Total

Function
0 1
20 7
4 29
24 36

27
33
60

74.07%
87.88%

Total

Percent

Drink H20
0
1
Total

Function
0 1
20 15
4 21
24 36

35
25
60

57.14%
84.00%

Total

Percent

HH List
0
1
Total

Function
0 1
22 18
2 18
24 36

40
20
60

55.00%
90.00%

Total

Percent

Bylaws
0
1
Total

Function
0 1
8 5
16 31
24 36

13
47
60

61.54%
65.96%

Function
Train Finance 0 1
0
13 11
1
11 25
Total
24 36

Total

Percent

24
36
60

54.17%
69.44%

Total Percent

Organized
0
1
Total

Function
0
1
7
8
13 24
20 32

Total Percent

Clean BH
0
1
Total

Function
0
1
12 9
12 27
24 36

Total Percent

Revise Rules
0
1
Total

Function
0
1
9
4
15 32
24 36

Caretaker
0
1
Total

Function Total Percent
0
1
12 8
20
60.00%
12 28 40
70.00%
60

15
37
52

21
39
60

13
47
60

46.67%
64.86%

57.14%
69.23%

69.23%
68.09%

Function
Fees Collected 0
1
0
19 18
1
5
18
Total
24 36

Total Percent

Function
0
1
13 9
11 27
24 36

Total Percent

Train Org.
0
1
Total

37
23
60

22
38
60

51.35%
78.26%

59.09%
71.05%
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Table 3: Relationship Between Ostrom Design Principles and Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable

Ostrom

Boundary
Local Rules
Collective
Monitor
Sanction
Conflict
Authority

Binary
Fix
Function
0.3624
0.5678***
0.1131
.4725**
0.1323
0.3372
0.1124
0.3167
0.0454
0.3865*
0.1041
0.2967
0.1104
0.0644
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Repair
0.4651***
0.4356
0.301
0.282
0.3683
0.2908
0.0377

Function
Index
0.2895
0.183
0.1637
0.1307
0.1346
0.2561
0.0684

I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective action, monitor, sanction,
conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance weighting to capture unique information in a set of
variables, opposed to weighting all variables equally. Refer to Table 1 for variables used in each individual index.
Column (1) is the binary function; column (2) is how many times it was fixed; column (3) is number of times the well
needed to be repaired; and column (4) is the index of all three.
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Table 4: Binary Estimates
VARIABLES
Boundary
Local Rules
Collective
Monitor
Sanction
Conflict
Authority
Condition of H20
Year Constructed
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
(3)
Function Binary Function Binary Function Binary
0.295***
(0.0972)
-0.0103
(0.141)
0.261
(0.243)
0.0242
(0.104)
-0.0712
(0.127)
-0.0969
(0.139)
0.00123
(0.106)
0.127
(0.0772)
0.0385
(0.0618)
-77.20
(124.3)

1.663***
(0.601)
-0.220
(0.695)
1.461
(1.265)
0.225
(0.506)
-0.408
(0.619)
-0.295
(0.691)
-0.117
(0.538)
0.667*
(0.396)
0.139
(0.317)
-280.5
(638.1)

1.030***
(0.353)
-0.144
(0.415)
0.868
(0.763)
0.137
(0.316)
-0.236
(0.377)
-0.162
(0.417)
-0.0812
(0.319)
0.410*
(0.238)
0.0716
(0.176)
-144.8
(354.3)

60
0.204

60

60

I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective
action, monitor, sanction, conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance
weighting to capture unique information in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables
equally. Refer to Table 1 for variables used in each individual index.
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the well i functioned at the time of survey.
Column (1) is a Linear Probability Model (2) is a Logit Model and (3) is a Probit Model and
includes the following controls: condition of the water (ranking variable) and the year the well
was constructed.
Standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1
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Table 5: Poisson Estimates
VARIABLES
Boundary
Local Rules
Collective
Monitor
Sanction
Conflict
Authority
Condition of H20
Year Constructed
Constant
Observations

(1)
Fixed

(2)
Repaired

0.697***
(0.159)
0.787***
(0.246)
0.727
(0.529)
0.0369
(0.234)
0.488*
(0.267)
-0.394*
(0.234)
-0.0513
(0.163)
-0.445*
(0.253)
-0.309***
(0.105)
623.0***
(210.3)

0.365***
(0.136)
0.397**
(0.202)
0.294
(0.387)
-0.0330
(0.130)
0.282
(0.213)
0.0418
(0.184)
-0.112
(0.152)
-0.426**
(0.176)
-0.318***
(0.121)
641.7***
(242.9)

58

58

I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective
action, monitor, sanction, conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance
weighting to capture unique information in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables
equally. Refer to Table 1 for variables used in each individual index.
The dependent variable in Column (1) is a count variable for how many times well i was
repaired from time of construction to time of survey. The dependent variable in Column (2) is
a count variable for how many times well i broke. Both models include the following controls:
condition of the water (ranking variable) and the year the well was constructed.
Robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 6: OLS Estimations
(1)
Function Index

(2)
Function Index

(3)
Function Index

(4)
Function Index

Condition of H20

0.169*
(0.0865)
-0.0455
(0.166)
0.0932
(0.250)
0.0137
(0.0829)
-0.0280
(0.137)
0.178
(0.173)
-0.0843
(0.156)
-

0.195**
(0.0917)
-0.0738
(0.167)
0.109
(0.255)
-0.00541
(0.0853)
-0.00949
(0.142)
0.186
(0.175)
-0.0662
(0.155)
-

Year Constructed

-

0.167**
(0.0790)
-0.0509
(0.184)
0.0914
(0.254)
0.0125
(0.0851)
-0.0320
(0.134)
0.183
(0.184)
-0.0879
(0.163)
-0.00988
(0.0783)
-

Constant

3.23e-08
(0.0639)

0.0305
(0.246)

-0.0875
(0.0692)
175.9
(139.2)

0.187**
(0.0819)
-0.0867
(0.189)
0.104
(0.260)
-0.00716
(0.0886)
-0.0199
(0.141)
0.202
(0.189)
-0.0700
(0.163)
-0.0308
(0.0876)
-0.0919
(0.0744)
184.8
(149.8)

Observations
R-squared

60
0.128

58
0.125

60
0.160

58
0.159

VARIABLES
Boundary
Local Rules
Collective
Monitor
Sanction
Conflict
Authority

I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective action, monitor,
sanction, conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance weighting to capture unique
information in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables equally. Refer to Table 1 for variables used in
each individual index.
The dependent variable is a Anderson (2008) index of functionality. The index is based on whether the well
functioned at the time of survey, how many times the well broke and how many times it was repaired. Column
(1) includes no controls (2) controls for the condition of the water (3) controls for the year the well was
constructed, and (4) controls for both condition of the water and the year the well was constructed.
Standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 7: Percent of Times Significant Out of 127 OLS Combinations

Frequency)of)10%)Signi2icance))

100%!
90%!
80%!
70%!
60%!
50%!
40%!
30%!
20%!
10%!
0%!
Boundary! Local! Collective! Monitor! Sanction! ConGlict! Authority!
Rules!
Action!
Anderson)Indices)

Table 8: Percent of Times Significant Out of 127 Poisson Combinations

Frrequency)of)!0%)Sign2icane)

100%!
90%!
80%!
70%!
60%!
50%!
40%!
30%!
20%!
10%!
0%!
Boundary!

Local!
Rules!

Collective! Monitor! Sanction! ConGlict! Authority!
Action!
Anderson)Index)
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Table 9: Stata Output from the Emily Oster Test
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Table 10
Summary of Key Research (papers published in reputable publications with more then 50 citations)
Title
Author
Journal
Cited Type
Explaining success on the commons: Community forest governance in the Indian
Himalaya
Agrawal, A
World Development 2006
203 Empirical
Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in South
Economic Development and
India
Bardhan, P
Change
310 Empirical
Is small really beautiful? Community-based natural resource management in Malawi and
Botswana.
Blaikie P
World Development 2006
394 Descriptive
Moral ecological rationality, institutions and the management of common property
resources
Cleaver
Development and change
271 Case Study
Paradoxes of participation: questioning participatory approaches to development
Journal of International
Cleaver
Development 1999
555 Descriptive
A lack of institutional demand: why a strong local community in Western Ecuador
Gibson CC, Becker People and Forests: Communities,
fails to protect its forest
CD
Institutions, and Governance.
98
Case Study
Institutional choice, community, and struggle: A case study of forest co-management in
Mexico
Klooster
World Development 2000
212 Case Study
The common property regime of the Huaorani
Indians of Ecuador: Implications and challenges to conservation
Lu, F.E.
Human Ecology 2001
57
Case Study
Donor-initiated common pool resource institutions: the case of the Yanesha forestry
Morrow CE, Hull
cooperative
RW
World Development 1996
93
Case Study
The symbolic making of a common property resource: History, ecology and locality in
Case
atank‐irrigated landscape in South India
Mosse, D
Development and change,1997
263 Study/Theory
What makes community forest management successful: a meta-study from community
Pagdee, A, Kim Y,
forests throughout the world.
Daugherty PJ
Society and Natural Resources, 2006 244 Meta-Analysis
Design principles and common pool resource management: An institutional approach to
Quinn, Huby,
Journal of Environmental
evaluating community management in semi-arid Tanzania
Kiwasila, ovett
Management
62
Empirical*
Organized participatory resource management: insights from community forestry
practices in India
Sekhe, M
Forest Policy and Economics, 2011 60
Empirical*
Common property, collective action and community
Singleton S,
Taylor M
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992 193 Descriptive
Collective action in common-pool resource management: The contribution of a social
Case
constructivist perspective to existing theory
Steins, Edwards
Society and Natural Resources, 1999 101 Study/Theory
Constraints on collective action in a transitional economy: the case of Bulgaria's irrigation
sector
Theesfeld
World Development 2004
93
Empirical*
Decision-making arrangements in community-based watershed management in northern Wittayapak,
Thailand
Dearden
Society and Natural Resources, 1999 66
Case Study

Resource Region
Forest

Asia

Irrigation Asia
Africa
Wells

Africa

Forest

Africa
Latin
America
Latin
America

Forest
Forest
Forest

Latin
America
Latin
America

Irrigation Asia
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Worldwide

Multiple Africa
Multiple Asia
Multiple Worldwide
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